We s tudy minimum cost spanning tree problems for a given set of users connected to a source. We propose a rule of sharing such that each user may pay her cost for such a tree plus an additional amount to the others users . A reduction of her cost appears as a compensation from the other users....

This note provides a way to translate an n-person strategic game to a characteristic cooperative game assuming that the set of players of the cooperative game is the set of pure actions of the strategic game. The Core is characterized through coalitions generated with only one action for each...

This paper studies the stability of communication protocols that deal with transmission errors. We consider a coordination game between an informed sender and an uninformed decision maker, the receiver, who communicate over a noisy channel. The sender's strategy, called a code, maps states of...

In this paper we experimentally test Schelling's (1971) segregation model and confirm the striking result of segregation. In addition, we extend Schelling's model theo- retically by adding strategic behavior and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational...

This paper analyzes the role played by two dimensions of entrepreneurs’ private social capital in the survival, growth and innovativeness of entrepreneurial service ventures: local size and preferential attachment degree. We build a bi-dimensional measure of social capital based on network...

This article shows the results of experiments where subjects play the Schelling’s spatial proximity model. Two types of experiments are conducted: one in which choices are made sequentially and a variation of the first where the decision making is simultaneous. The results of the...

We examine the interplay between a person's individual preference and the social influence others exert. We provide a model of network relationships with conflicting preferences, where individuals are better off coordinating with those around them, but not all prefer the same action. We test our...