In this paper we analyze the explicit representation of fixed agenda social choice correspondence under different rationality assumptions (independence, neutrality, monotonicity, ...). It is well know in the literature that, under some of theses assumptions, the existence of dictators,...

In this paper we analyze the relationship between acyclic social decision functions and fixed agenda social choice correspondences which verify some rationality conditions (such as Pareto, independence, monotonicity or neutrality). This enables us to translate known sesults of monlotonicity or...

Consider a two-person bargaining problem, where both agents have a particular notion of what would be a just solution outcome. In case their opinions differ, a procedure which leads to a compromise between t,he two different views is needed. In this paper we propose a mechanism to solve this...

On analyzing the problem that arises whenever the set of maximal elements is large, and aselection is then required (see Peris and Subiza, 1998), we realize that logical ways of selectingamong maximals violate the classical notion and axioms of rationality. We arrive at the sameconclusion if we...

In this paper we analyze the existence of three different kinds of continuous numerical representations for binary relations by using a finite measure defined on the space of alternatives. Each one of these kinds of representation is suitable for a different class of binary relations. Thus we...

The article proposes a new algorithm for adjusting correlation matrices and for comparison with Finger's algorithm, which is used to compute Value-at-Risk in RiskMetrics for stress test scenarios. The solution proposed by the new methodology is always better than Finger's approach in the sense...

The rationalization of a choice function in terms of assumptions which involve expansion or contraction properties of the feasible set over nonfinite sets is analyzed. Schwartz's results [15], stated in the finite case, are extended to this more general framework. Moreover a characterization...

Choice functions on tournaments always select the maximal element (Condorcet winner), provided they exist, but this property does not hold in the more general case of weak tournaments. In this paper we analyze the relationship between the usual choice functions and the set of maximal elements in...

In a distribution problem, and specifically in bankruptcy issues, the Proportional (P) and theEgalitarian (EA) divisions are two of the most popular ways to resolve the conflict. TheConstrained Equal Awards rule (CEA) is introduced in bankruptcy literature to ensure that noagent receives more...

A weaker than usual continuity condition for acyclic preferences is introduced. For preorders this condition turns out to be equivalent to lower continuity, but in general this is not true. By using this condition, a numerical representation which is upper semicontinuous is obtained. This fact...