In this paper we present a market-based mechanim for allocating public goods which implements the Ratio correspondence in both Nash and Strong Equilibria.

In this paper we present a partial equilibrium model of tax evasion. Several equilibrium concepts are used to analyze the game of the Government against a single taxpayer.

In this paper, we study the relationship between efficient and optimal allocations in a Chamberlinian framework.

In this paper we study an oligopolistic equilibria in which (possibly few) corporations can create as many firms as they like. It is shown by means of two examples that under constant returns to scale, Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria implies perf ect competition.

In this paper we consider a model in which agents have complete information about their neighbours and, possibly, incomplete information about the rest of the economy. We consider two different informational frameworks. In the first, agents do not have priors about what is going on in the rest...

This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can be formed. Finally, we study economies in...

In this paper, we assume that firms can create independent divisions which compete in quantities in a homogeneous good market. Assuming complete information, identical firms and constant returns to scale, we prove the following: 1) Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) implies Perfect...

The theory of mechanism design and implementation abounds with clever mechanisms whose equilibrium outcomes are optimal according to some social choice rule. However, the cleverness of these mechanisms relies on intricate systems of rewards and punishments off-the-equilibrium path. Generally, it...