The set of possible outcomes of a strongly ordinal bimatrix game is studied by imbedding each pair of possible payoffs as a point on the standard two-dimensional integral lattice. In particular, we count the number of different Pareto optimal sets of each cardinality; we establish asymptotic...

A simple optimal garnishing rule to discourage strategic bankruptcy is derived.

This paper discusses the notion of "enough money" in strategic market games. In an economy with one money, m-1 markets and no credit, in order to be able to achieve efficient trade there must be "enough money" held by all traders. In essence "enough money" means that the noncooperative...

A simultaneous double auction market with bid and offer cards was utilized in classes on the theory and history of money and financial institutions and occasionally in classes on the theory of games. The prime purpose in using this game was to teach the students how to construct process models...

Three variations of the core of a market game representing an exchange economy are considered and compared. The possibility for utilizing the Walrasian core to reflect certain monetary phenomena is noted.

We criticize the R.E.E. approach to asymmetric information general equilibrium because it does not explain how information gets "into" the prices. This leads to well-known paradoxes. We suggest a multiperiod game instead, where the flow of information into and out of prices is explicitly...

We study the relation between the stability of a competitive equilibrium (CE) and the price adjustment mechanism used to attain that equilibrium point. Using two specific examples, a three-commodity exchange economy with a unique competitive equilibrium (Scarf's global instability example) and a...