The prime purpose of this article is to illustrate some basic problems in the modelling of strategic market games with a single means of exchange or with complete markets. A simple example involving three types of traders trading in three commodities serves to make the points clear.

Sufficient conditions are demonstrated for the non-emptiness of asymptotic cores of sequences of replica games, i.e., for all sufficiently large replications, the games have non-empty approximate cores and the approximation can be made arbitrarily "good." The conditions are simply that the games...

A sketch of a game theoretic approach to the Theory of Money and Financial Institutions is presented in a nontechnical, nonmathematical manner. The detailed argument and specifics are presented in previous articles and in a forthcoming book.

The monetary and fiscal control of a simple economy without outside randomness is studied here from the micro-economic basis of a strategic market game. The government's bureaucracy is treated as a public good that provides services at a cost. A conventional public good is also considered.

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets (GEI) to allow for default. Default can be either strategic, or due to ill-fortune. Agents who default are penalized to a degree proportional to the size of their default and to penalty parameters lambda. We find that...