A brief narrative and descriptive discussion of the role of private dealers in art together with some suggestive statistics is presented.

In this paper we examine the structure of the core of a trading economy with three competitive equilibria as the number of traders (N) is varied. We also examine the sensitivity of the multiplicity of equilibria and of the core to variations in individual initial endowments. Computational...

We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is...

This is the first projected series of papers on solutions to games in matrix and extensive form.

A series of models (kept simple in order to stress the structure of the models and the nature of the questions) are described and problems are posed pertaining to a dynamic economy with various possibilities for the issuance of fiat money, credit and insurance.

The exchange economy E can be reformulated as a strategic market game. In particular the point of concern here involves the introduction of a specified amount of credit or fiat money to monetize exchange. Dubey and Shubik (1979) and Shubik and Wilson (1977) have studied the possibility of...

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets (GEI) to allow for default. The equilibrating variables include aggregate default levels, as well as prices of assets and commodities. Default can be either strategic, or due to ill-fortune. It can be caused by events...

A general model of a coalition production economy allowing set-up costs, indivisibilities, and non-convexities is developed. It is shown that for all sufficiently large replications, approximate cores of the economy are non-empty.

If an exchange economy is modeled as a strategic market game with one commodity serving as a money, then if there is no credit available and if all traders are insignificant in size, so that an individual does not influence prices, the noncooperative equilibria (NEs) of the game will coincide...