Similar Search Results

How to Auction an Essential Facility When Underhand Integration is Possible

Engel, Eduardo M. R. A.; Galetovic, Alexander; Fischer, … - 2003

floor, however, a Demsetz auction is worse than no regulation at all of the bottleneck monopoly. Our results apply beyond …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014120511

How to Auction an Essential Facility When Underhand Integration Is Possible

Engel, Eduardo; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2002

floor, however, a Demsetz auction is worse than no regulation at all of the bottleneck monopoly. Our results apply beyond …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093961

How to Auction an Essential Facility When Underhand Integration is Possible

Engel, Eduardo; Fischer, Ronald; Galetovic, Alexander - Economic Growth Center, Economics Department - 2002

floor, however, a Demsetz auction is worse than no regulation at all of the bottleneck monopoly. Our results apply beyond …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005558475

Investments in electricity generating capacity under different market structures and with endogenously fixed demand

Boom, Anette - 2003

capacities can be larger or smaller with a duopoly than with a monopoly. If the two firms co-ordinate on a pareto dominant …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278102

Aftermarket welfare and procurement auctions

Karamychev, Vladimir A. - 2023

Aftermarket social welfare is largely determined by a procurement auction design. Auctions select firms for operating … aftermarket social welfare generated by first-price and second-price procurement auctions. It reveals that the social welfare …-price procurement auctions are welfare-equivalent. When it increases (or decreases) with price, first-price (or second-price) auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014469623

Vertical Structure and the Risk of Rent Extraction in the Electricity Industry

Boom, Anette; Buehler, Stefan - 2018

This paper studies how competition and vertical structure jointly determine generating capacities, retail prices, and welfare in the electricity industry. Analyzing a model in which demand is uncertain and retailers must commit to retail prices before they buy electricity in the wholesale...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012142389

Vertical structure and the risk of rent extraction in the electricity industry

Boom, Anette; Bühler, Stefan - 2018 - This draft: August 23, 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012023903

Investments in Electricity Generating Capacity under Different Market Structures and with Endogenously Fixed Demand

Boom, Anette - Abteilung "Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller … - 2003

capacities can be larger or smaller with a duopoly than with a monopoly. If the two firms co-ordinate on a pareto dominant …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772941

On the Uniqueness of Optimal Prices Set by Monopolistic Sellers

den Berg, Gerard J van - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper considers price determination by monopolistic sellers who know the distribution of valuations among the potential buyers. We derive a novel condition under which the optimal price set by the monopolist is unique. In many settings, this condition is easy to interpret, and it is valid...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789129

Auctioning to Buyers with Correlated Values

Hammond, Robert G. - Department of Economics, Poole College of Management - 2007

In a laboratory setting, a monopolistic auctioneer sells to buyers as the level and nature of demand changes. I ask whether sellers correctly recognize the role played by correlation among buyers' values. The prices set by subjects closely match the risk-neutral benchmark predictions when demand...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008486913