[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We consider Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types and either private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of "congruence." We show that in these settings, interim...

[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] The paper considers the communication complexity (measured in bits or real numbers) of Nash implementation of social choice rules. A key distinction is whether we restrict to the traditional one-stage mechanisms...

IEA World Congress, December 1995

March 2003 <p> We introduce a two-sided matching model with contracts that subsumes and extends the Gale-Shapley matching model, the Kelso-Crawford labor market model and the Ausubel-Milgrom package auction model. We identify the maximal set of preferences over contracts for which a stable match...</p>

The lack of proper enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt generates a commitment failure. As a result, a sovereign may seek to improve its position in debt renegotiations and thus evade its debt obligations by reducing exports. Conditionality seeks to provide a solution to the incentive...