This article analyzes whether political connections of the board of directors of publicly traded companies in the USA affect the allocation of government procurement contracts. It focuses on the change in control of both House and Senate following the 1994 election and finds that companies with...

In the first chapter of my dissertation I study the costs and benefits of resource allocation by firms and by markets. When a firm forms a market closes. Resources that were previously allocated via the price system are now allocated by managerial authority. We explore the choice of...

In a multidivision firm, does the market collect less value-relevant information when the divisions are treated as a unit rather than when each division trades as a separate firm? We find that organizational form has a nontrivial impact on information collection. In particular, we find that a...

This article explores whether political connections are important in the United States. The article uses an original hand-collected data set on the political connections of board members of S&P 500 companies to sort companies into those connected to the Republican Party and those connected to...

This paper examines how information becomes reflected in prices when investment decisions are delegated to fund managers whose tenure may be shorter than the time it takes for their private information to become public. We consider a sequence of managers, where each subsequent manager inherits...