The purpose of this paper is to study capital budgeting in a setting where emphasis is on control over project selection. We construct a model of a multidivisional firm in which there are no constraints on investment and all projects have a positive net present value. Nevertheless, we show that...

This paper analyzes the role of the agent's bankruptcy constraints in multiperiod principal-agent models with asymmetric information. Conditions are provided under which commitment to a long-term contract involving N rounds of investment improves upon repetition of N identical single-period...

This paper presents a principal-agent model in which subsequent to contracting the risk averse agent becomes informed about the production process. Communication of the agent's information is always valuable. The optimal contract given this information asymmetry is characterized by less...

A simple two-period model with information asymmetry and restriction on transfers is used to induce an inter temporal relationship between a sequence of investment decisions. The owner's reputation for honoring commitments to ex post inefficient production decisions allows her to make efficient...

This paper adopts a valuation perspective within an asymmetric information setting and explores properties of economic income. The optimal intertemporal contract induces an accrual component of income which would not exist absent the information problem. The contracting solution introduces a...