The introduction of sanctions provides incentives for more pro-social behavior, but may also be a signal that non-cooperation is prevalent. In an experimental minimum-effort coordination game we investigate the effects of the information contained in the choice to sanction. We compare the effect...

This paper introduces the concept of ordient for binary relations (preferences), a relative of the concept of gradient for functions (utilities). Ordients have a natural economic interpretation as marginal rates of substitution. Some examples of ordientable binary relations include the...

We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk about future plans and talk about past actions. The language from which messages are chosen is endogenous, messages are...

This paper introduces the concept of ordient for binary relations (preferences), a relative of the concept of gradients for functions (utilities). The lexicographic order, albeit not representable, has an ordient. Not only binary relations representable by differentiable functions have an...

We run an experiment that implements a finitely repeated version of the trust game in which players can choose in each period with whom to interact. Change in trust and trustworthiness in terms of previous experience is statistically investigated where confounding factors are controlled for....

We consider the problem of pricing a single object when the seller has only minimal information about the true valuation of the buyer. Specifically, the seller only knows the support of the possible valuations and has no further distributional information. The seller is solving this choice...