Taking as a reference a model in which there are a public firm, a national private firm and a foreign private one, it is analyzed both mergers sustainability and their relative effects on welfare. It is proved that the merger between the public firm and either the national or the international...

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of privatization in a mixed duopoly, wherea private firm competes in quantities with a welfare-maximizing public firm. We consider twoinefficiencies of the public sector: a possible cost inefficiency, and an allocative inefficiencydue to the...

In this paper, we provide an explanation of why privatization may attract foreign investorsinterested in entering a regional market. Privatization turns the formerly-public firm into a lessaggressive competitor since profit- maximizing output is lower than the welfare-maximizingone. The drawback...

This paper examines the validity of alternative assumptions aboutpublic enterprise strategies in the presence of both domestic and internationalcompetition. It extends the quantity-setting game to apreplay stage and endogenizes the firms’ order of moves to show thati) Cournot competition is...

We provide a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanism whereby privatization of international airports can improve welfare. The model consists of a downstream (airline) duopoly with two inputs landings at two airports) and two types of consumers. The airline companies compete...

We analyze the impact of partial public ownership (PPO) on managerial incentives. A novelty of the paper is that it explicitly considers competition in the product market. We find that PPO negatively affects managerial incentives when all firms are partially owned by the government. When...

Taking as a reference a model in which there are a public firm, a national private firm and a foreign private one, it is analyzed both mergers sustainability and their relative effects on welfare. It is proved that the merger between the public firm and either the national or the international...

The aim of this paper is to complement the existing literature on horizontal mergers, by setting a Cournot mixed oligopoly model. Specifically, the merger paradox is qualified by proving that a merger could be profitable for the merging firms even if it does not include most market firms....

We analyze a Bayesian merger game under two-sided asymmetric information about firm types. We show that the standard prediction of the lemons market model–if any, only low-type firms are traded–is likely to be misleading: Merger returns, i.e. the difference between pre- and post-merger...

We provide a framework for analyzing bilateral mergers when there is two-sided asymmetric information about firms’ types. We show that there is always a "no-merger" equilibrium where firms do not consent to a merger, irrespective of their type. There may also be a "cut-off" equilibrium if the...