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A Derivation of Expected Utility Maximization in the Context of a Game.

Gilboa, I.; Schmeidler, D. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 2001

A decision maker faces a decision problem, or a game against nature. For each probability distribution over the state of the world (nature`s strategies), she has a weak order over her acts (pure strategies). We formulate conditions on these weak orders guaranteeing that they can be jointly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005675378

Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities.

Binmore, K.; Proulx, C.; Samuelson, L.; Swierzbinski, J. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1996

This paper examines an Outside Option Game Designed to study the tension between maximizing the size of the surplus and bargaining over the division of thus surplus among those who contributed to its creation.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443405

Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model.

Eshel, I.; Samuelson, L.; Shaked, A. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1996

This paper studies a population of agents, each of whom can be either an Altruist or an Egoist. Altruists confer benefits on others at a cost to themselves. Altruism is thus a strictly dominated strategy and cannot survive if agents are rational best-responders. We assume that agents choose...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443416

How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?

Mailath, G.J.; Samuelson, L. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1996

We show that a strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasi-perfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443499

The Dummies Guide' to Lottery Design.

Walker, I.; Young, J. - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2000

This paper outlines the issues relevant to the operation of lottery games. We consider how such games should be … designed, what a portfolio of games might look like, how the operator should be regulated, how spending on lottery games should … be taxed, and what considerations are relevant to the use of the revenue from such games. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005747083

Some First Results for Noncooperative Pregames : Social Conformity and Equilibrium in Pure Strategies.

Wooders, M.; Selten, R.; Cartwright, E. - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2001

We introduce the framework of noncooperative pregames and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005747143

Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing.

Bardsley, P. - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 1997

Tax compliance is modelled as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a costly state verification game with imperfect auditing. Neither the tax payer nor the auditor can measure the tax payer's true liability precisely: they observe independent noisy signals.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574835

The Government's Discount Rate: Choices and Consequences in a Dynamic Framework

Stemp, P.J. - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 1997

This paper considers a closed macroeconomy where the monetary authority pursues an inflation target and policy outcomes are the consequences of a Nash game between fiscal and monetary authorities. The specification of the macroeconomic framework is characterized by nonlinearities which lead to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005578936

Multisided Matching Games.

Sherstyuk, K. - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 1997

The paper considers an extension of the original Shapley and Shubik (1972) two-sided matching problem to the case of multisided matching with transfereable utility. We investigate existence and properties of stable matchings using the approach of cooperative game theory.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005578966

Basins of Attraction, Long Run Equilibria, and the Speed of Step-by- Step Evolution.

Ellison, G. - Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of … - 1996

The paper provides a general analysis of the types of models with E-Perturbations which have been used recently to discuss the evolution of social conventions. Two new measures of the size and structure of the basins of attraction of dynamic systems, the radius and coradius, are introduced in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005587264