This volume contains eight papers written by Adam Brandenburger and his co-authors over a period of 25 years. These papers are part of a program to reconstruct game theory in order to make how players reason about a game a central feature of the theory. The program — now called epistemic game...

Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an n-person game are given in terms of what the players know and believe — about the game, and about each other's rationality, actions, knowledge, and beliefs. Mixed strategies are treated not as conscious randomizations, but as conjectures, on the...

Suppose that each player in a game is rational, each player thinks the other players are rational, and so on. Also, suppose that rationality is taken to incorporate an admissibility requirement — that is, the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies. Which strategies can be played? We provide...

Game-theoretic analysis often leads to consideration of an infinite hierarchy of beliefs for each player. Harsanyi suggested that such a hierarchy of beliefs could be summarized in a single entity, called the player's type. This chapter provides an elementary construction, complementary to the...

Best-response sets (Pearce [1984]) characterize the epistemic condition of “rationality and common belief of rationality.” When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler [2008])...

We discuss the unity between the two standard approaches to noncooperative solution concepts for games. The decision-theoretic approach starts from the assumption that the rationality of the players is common knowledge. This leads to the notion of correlated rationalizability. It is shown that...

Correlations arise naturally in noncooperative games, e.g., in the equivalence between undominated and optimal strategies in games with more than two players. But the noncooperative assumption is that players do not coordinate their strategy choices, so where do these correlations come from? The...

A paradox of self-reference in beliefs in games is identified, which yields a game-theoretic impossibility theorem akin to Russell's Paradox. An informal version of the paradox is that the following configuration of beliefs is impossible:Ann believes that Bob assumes thatAnn believes that Bob's...