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We make two main contributions to the theory of network formation. First, we introduce a new notion of farsighted equilibrium in network formation. In particular, we introduce the notion of a farsightedly basic network, as well as the notion of a farsighted basis. Given the feasible set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368575
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a framework in which the notion of farsighted stability for games, introduced by Chwe (1994), can be applied to direct networks. Then using Chwe's basic result on the nonemptiness of farsighted stable sets for games, we show that for any given...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005747045
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a framework in which the notion of farsighted stability for games, introduced by Chwe (1994), can be applied to directed networks. In particular, we introduce the notion of a supernetwork. A supernetwork is made up of a collection of directed...
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Networks and Farsighted Stability By Frank H. Page, Jr. Department of Finance University of Alabama Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 USA fpage@cba.ua.edu Myrna H. Wooders Department of Economics University of Warwick Coventry CV4 7AL UK M.Wooders@warwick.ac.uk Samir Kamat Portfolio Management Group Wachovia...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063581
We demonstrate that if any realization of a strategy for a Bayesiangame is, with high probability, an approximate Nash equilibrium of the induced game of complete information, then there is purification of that strategy that is an approximate equilibrium of the original Bayesian game. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368553
We consider a general equilibrium local public goods economy in which agents have two distinguishing characteristics. The first is 'crowding type', which is publicly observable and provides direct costs or benefits to the jurisdiction (coalition or firms) the agent joins. The second is taste...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368593
We introduce a framework of noncooperative pregames, in which players are characterized by their attributes, and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, there exist approximate (e) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In fact, every mixed strategy equilibrium can be used to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368599