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Szydlowski, Martin - 2019

I study a continuous-time principal-agent model in which the principal is ambiguity averse about the agent's effort cost. The robust contract generates a seemingly excessive pay-performance sensitivity. The worst-case effort cost is high after good performance, but low after bad performance,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905754

Dynamic Contracting Under Soft Information

Roger, Guillaume - 2019

A principal delegates the running of a project to an agent subject to moral hazard over an infinite horizon, and cannot observe any of the outcomes. The agent sends reports at each instant t; naturally reports may be manipulated. Eliciting truthful revelation is necessary to the provision of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891116

Termination Fees and Contract Design in Public-Private Partnerships

Buso, Marco - 2019

We study the effects of granting an exit option that enables the private party to early terminate a PPP project if it turns out to be loss-making. In a continuous time setting with hidden information about stochastic operating profits, we show that a revenue-maximizing government can optimally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895272

Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats

Khalil, Fahad - 2018

We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The …-powered incentives remain even in an alternative centralized setting, where the funding authority contracts directly with the agent using …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938445

Nitpicky Insurers and the Law of Contracts

Bourgeon, Jean-Marc - 2017

show how the law of insurance contracts should allow insurers to incentivize policyholders to exert an adequate level of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012945057

Duality in Contracting

Bardsley, Peter - 2017

theorem for optimal contracts under adverse selection under very weak assumptions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975989

Seemingly Exploitative Contracts

Yu, Pei Cheng - 2020

exploitative features could introduce additional distortions. In contrast, contracts that are truly exploitative induce over …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851554

Blockchain and the Future of Optimal Financing Contracts

Tinn, Katrin - 2018

Blockchain technology makes it possible to create immutable smart contracts that are based on reliable and timestamped … records of transactions. These new features imply that contracts for raising external financing could now depend on when, and … as more frequent decision making magnifies the negative features of debt contracts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932326

Optimal Long-term Contracts with Disability Insurance under Limited Commitment

Choi, Kyoung Jin; Jeon, Junkee; Lee, Ho-Seok; Lin, … - 2021

We study an optimal long-term labor contract that provides disability insurance benefits under two frictions: the agent cannot commit to a long-term contract and the disability shock is private information. We predict that a job with a high risk of disability should provide a higher level of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013249430

Optimal Dynamic Contract of Influence

Chen, Yi - 2021

In this paper, I study the optimal dynamic contract in a principal-agent model wherein the agent with transparent preferences privately observes a persistently evolving state. Over time, the principal takes actions to match a state-dependent target, where actions are committed based on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013249921