Measures of health status, such as e.g. the QALY (Quality Adjusted Life Years) measure, have been proposed as a tool in the economic assessment of new medical technologies, and its possible foundations in individual utility theory have been discussed in the literature. However, the problems of...

This paper relates credit market structure to efficiency in product markets. It is shown that debt financing with limited liability mute the borrower's incentives. The main theorem compares "industry banking" to independent financing of firms. When firms' effort levels are strategic substitutes...

This paper considers allocation rules. First, we demonstrate that costs allocated by the Aumann-Shapley and the Friedman-Moulin cost allocation rules are easy to determine in practice using convex envelopment of registered cost data and parametric programming. Second, from the linear programming...

Functions mapping the set of symmetric matrices with non-negative entries into itself are monotonous with respect to the associated order structure. Such functions are analytic and the derivatives in zero of arbitrary order are non-negative.

This paper provides an empirical investigation of the wage, price and unemployment dynamics that have taken place in Spain during the last two decades. The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the impact of the European economic integration process on Spanish labour market and the...

This paper augments an R&D-based growth model of the third generation with human capital accumulation and impure altruism, calibrates it with U.S. data, and investigates whether the market provides too little or too much R&D. For benchmark parameters the market share of employment in R&D is...

In this paper we provide evidence on the survival and growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam relying on three partly overlapping enterprise surveys sampled during the period 1990-2002. Our empirical results indicate that classical determinants of performance including...

A stochastic learning process for signaling games with two types, two signals, and two responses gives rise to equilibrium selection which is in remarkable accordance with the selection obtained by the intuitive criterion.

In a strategic environment, when a player's information acquisition is observable to others, it may strictly decrease the player's resulting equilibrium payoff even if information acquisition itself is costless. This phenomenon has previously been known by a number of examples. This paper shows...