We report results from an exploratory study using eye-tracking recording of information acquisition by players in a game theoretic learning paradigm. Eye-tracking is used to observe what information subjects look at in 4x4 normal-form games; the eye-tracking results favor sophisticated learning...

The Boston mechanism is among the most popular school choice procedures in use. Yet, the mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances, which led the Boston Public Schools to recently replace it with Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm (henceforth,...

The Boston mechanism is among the most popular school choice procedures in use. Yet, the mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances, which led the Boston Public Schools to recently replace it with Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm (henceforth,...

This paper provides existence and characterization of the optimal contest success function under the condition that the objective of the contest designer is total effort maximization among n heterogeneous players. Heterogeneity of players makes active participation of a player in equilibrium...

Around 1947, von Neumann showed that for any finite two-person zero-sum game, there is a feasible linear programming (LP) problem consisting of a primal-dual pair of linear programs whose saddle points yield equilibria of the game, thus providing an immediate proof of the minimax theorem from...

I develop a model in which the ability to repay a loan is private information that can only be verified by the bank at some costs, which can be recovered from the borrower if it has reported untruthfully. The bank will optimize the resources it spends on this auditing of borrowers and the...

This paper develops a framework for analyzing the effect of arbitrary changes to network structure in linear-quadratic games on networks. Changes to network structure which increase total activity and total utility are studied for the case of strategic complements and strategic substitutes....

Blockchain implementations of auctions have to deal with the problem of front-running: block production happens at discrete intervals, and anyone can inspect and react to the incoming bids before they are written on chain. The presence of smart contracts among bidders, a hallmark of automated...

We examine a rent-seeking contest by teams, where team members can sabotage their teammates. In this setting, the effective effort (the effort level discounted by the sabotaged level) determines a team's winning probability and the shares of the winning prize. Thus, coordinating the effective...

We survey the uses of combinatorial auctions that have been deployed in practice. We specify the key representational, computational, and economic aspects of deployed combinatorial auctions. Finally, we discuss behavioral economics considerations on both sides of the market, and the interrelated...