Showing 1 - 10 of 160
This paper studies the relationship between competition and incentives in an economy with financial contracts. We concentrate on non-exclusive credit relationships, those where an entrepreneur can simultaneously accept more than one contractual offer. Several homogeneous lenders compete on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014589036
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. In this context, we identify a class of direct and incentive compatible mechanisms: each principal privately recommends to each agent to reveal her private information to the other principals, and each agent behaves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009150955
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard: principals compete through mechanisms in the presence of agents who take unobservable actions. In this context, we provide a rationale for restricting principals to make use of simple mechanisms, which correspond to direct...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009150956
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information in which each agent can at most participate with one principal. In such contexts, we show that the restriction to direct truthful mechanisms involves a loss of generality, even if one only focuses on pure strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009150957
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. In this context, we identify a class of direct and incentive compatible mechanisms: each principal privately recommends to each agent to reveal her private information to the other principals, and each agent behaves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014180095
We study competing-mechanism games under exclusive competition: principals first simultaneously post mechanisms, then agents simultaneously choose to participate and communicate with at most one principal. In this setting, which is common to competing-auction and competitive-search applications,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105878
We study games in which several principals design mechanisms in the presence of privately informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each type of each agent can participate with at most one principal and meaningfully communicate only with him. Economic models of exclusive competition restrict...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014112170
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard: Principals compete through mechanisms in the presence of agents who take unobservable actions. In this context, we provide a rationale for restricting principals to make use of simple mechanisms, which correspond to direct...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123960
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information in which each agent can at most participate with one principal. In such contexts, we show that the restriction to direct truthful mechanisms involves a loss of generality, even if one only focuses on pure strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013067730
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003382788