In many situations one has to choose between risky alternatives, knowing only one's past experience with those alternatives. Such decisions can be made in more – or less – benevolent settings or 'worlds'. In a 'good world', high payoffs are more frequent than low payoffs, and vice versa in a...

In their seminal works, Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) defined two aspects of risk aversion: absolute risk aversion and relative risk aversion. Based on their definitions, we define two aspects of risk: absolute risk and relative risk. We consider situations in which, by making an investment, an...

This paper continues the work initiated in [19]. We adopt the same model as in [19]. We show that the non-backward-induction equilibrium component may be evolutionarily stable for any population size in a finite stopping game where the two equilibrium components are terminated by different...

We investigated how perspective-taking might be used to overcome bias and improve advice-based judgments. Decision makers often tend to underweight the opinions of others relative to their own, and thus fail to exploit the wisdom of others. We tested the idea that decision makers taking the...

There is accumulating evidence that prior knowledge about expectations plays an important role in perception. The Bayesian framework is the standard computational approach to explain how prior knowledge about the distribution of expected stimuli is incorporated with noisy observations in order...

We introduce ideas and methods from distribution theory into value theory. This novel approach enables us to construct new diagonal formulas for the Mertens value and the Neyman value on a large space of non-differentiable games. This in turn enables us to give an affirmative answer to the...

We prove that every continuous value on a space of vector measure market games $Q$, containing the space of nonatomic measures $NA$, has the \textit{conic property}, i.e., if a game $v\in Q$ coincides with a nonatomic measure $\nu$ on a conical diagonal neighborhood then $\varphi(v)=\nu$. We...

We study non-zero-sum continuous-time stochastic games, also known as continuous-time Markov games, of fixed duration. We concentrate on Markovian strategies. We show by way of example that equilibria need not exist in Markovian strategies, but they always exist in Markovian public-signal...

A new and fast learning method is described in the context of teaching a program to play chess. A theory of the meaning of a position evaluation is developed, and is then confronted with a large collection of games played by masters or other programs. The program learns by fitting its evaluation...

We prove that a single-valued solution of perfectly competitive TU economies underling nonatomic exact market games is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always a core element, this result provides an axiomatization of the...