We introduce asymptotic analysis of stochastic games with short-stage duration. The play of stage $k$, $k\geq 0$, of a stochastic game $\Gamma_\delta$ with stage duration $\delta$ is interpreted as the play in time $k\delta\leq t<(k+1)\delta$, and therefore the average payoff of the $n$-stage play per unit of time is the sum of the payoffs in the first $n$ stages divided by $n\delta$, and the $\lambda$-discounted present value of a payoff $g$ in stage $k$ is $\lambda^{k\delta} g$. We define convergence, strong convergence, and exact convergence of the data of a family $(\Gamma_\delta)_{\delta>0}$ as the stage duration $\delta$ goes to $0$, and study the...</(k+1)\delta$,>

Can noncooperative behaviour of merchants lead to a market allocation that <I>prima facie</I> seems anticompetitive? We introduce a model in which service providers aim at optimizing the number of customers who use their services, while customers aim at choosing service providers with minimal customer...</i>

Gale and Sotomayor (1985) have shown that in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm (1962), the proposed-to side W (referred to as <i>women</i> there) can strategically force the W-optimal stable matching as the M-optimal one by truncating their preference lists, each woman possibly blacklisting <i>all but...</i>