Showing 1 - 10 of 39,688
This study analyzes a continuous-time N-agent Brownian hidden-action model with exponential utilities, in which agents' actions jointly determine the mean and the variance of the outcome process. In order to give a theoretical justi¯cation for the use of linear contracts, as in Holmstrom and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015229853
We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. Principals are competitors in the product market and write contracts also on the base of an expected aggregate. The model is a version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501297
What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a `sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision-maker takes an action in each period. Using a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536988
We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. Principals are competitors in the product market and write contracts also on the base of an expected aggregate. The model is a version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012616328
This paper constructs the equilibrium for a specific code that can be seen as a “universal grammar” in a class of common interest Sender–Receiver games where players communicate through a noisy channel. We propose a Senderʼs signaling strategy which does not depend on either the game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049783
We consider situations in which a principal tries to induce an agent to spend e®ort on accumulating a state variable that a®ects the well-being of both parties. The only incentive mechanism that the principal can use is a state-dependent transfer of her own utility to the agent. Formally, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988913
In many real world negotiations, from wage contract bargaining to product liability disputes, the bargaining parties often interact repeatedly and have the option of seeking outside judgement. This paper studies a model of repeated bargaining with a third party to analyze how and why bargaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102087
This paper is a note in which we prove that Cellular Automata are suitable tools to model multi-agent interactive procedures. In particular, we apply the argument to validate results from simulation tools obtained for the classical model of segregation of Thomas Schelling (1971a).
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731213
We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information with the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731241
This paper shows the existence of an equilibrium pragmatic Language with a universal grammar as a coordination device under communication misunderstandings. Such a language plays a key role in achieving efficient outcomes in those Sender-Receiver games where there may exist noisy information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008522670