In this paper, we consider Stackelberg games in a multiperiod vertical contracting model with uncertain demand. Demand has a distribution with a mean and variance that depend on the current retail price, and this dependence may vary from period to period. We focus on a class of problems in which...

In classical perfect and complete markets prices form a Martingale and stock returns (or equivalently, successive price changes) are serially uncorrelated. However, there is evidence that stock returns are serially correlated in both the short and the long-term; this has been construed as a...

In classical perfect and complete markets, prices form a Martingale and stock returns (or equivalently, successive price changes) are serially uncorrelated. However, there is considerable evidence in the finance literature showing that stock returns are serially correlated both in the short and...

This paper studies discounted stochastic games perfect or imperfect public monitoring and the opportunity to conduct voluntary monetary transfers. We show that for all discount factors every public perfect equilibrium payoff can be implemented with a simple class of equilibria that have a...

Imperfect measurement of uncertainty (deeper uncertainty) in climate sensitivity is introduced in a two-sectoral integrated assessment model (IAM) with endogenous growth, based on an extension of DICE. The household expresses ambiguity aversion and can use robust control via a 'shadow ambiguity...

NK models are agent-based simulations of market evolution generated through new entry and firm innovation, and are often focused on better understanding complex interdependencies in organizational phenomena. We provide a counterpoint to the mostly optimistic descriptions of the advantages and of...

We characterise the entire set of symmetric stationary Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPE) in a differential game of public good investment, using the canonical problem of climate change as an example. We provide a sufficient and necessary condition for MPE and show how the entire set of MPE is...

We characterize dynamic rational addiction to a harmful product by an informed individual who is connected to a network of users of the addictive product. The network harms the individual and imposes peer pressure on her to consume the addictive product. The network contributes to the state...

In monopoly pricing situations, firms should optimally vary prices to learn demand. The variation must be sufficiently high to ensure complete learning. In competitive situations, however, varying prices provides information to competitors and may reduce the value of learning. Such situations...

We study a two-stage purchase contract with a demand forecast update. The purchase contract provides the buyer an opportunity to adjust an initial commitment based on an updated demand forecast obtained at a later stage. An adjustment, if any, incurs a fixed as well as a variable cost. Using a...