We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. Principals are competitors in the product market and write contracts also on the base of an expected aggregate. The model is a version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning...

We examine dynamic contracts when output has negative environmental effects and the manager (agent) can invest to build up ESG capital and mitigate the externality. The incentive component of the optimal contract rewards based on cash flow and ESG capital when the principal is risk neutral; and...

This study analyzes a continuous-time N-agent Brownian hidden-action model with exponential utilities, in which agents' actions jointly determine the mean and the variance of the outcome process. In order to give a theoretical justi¯cation for the use of linear contracts, as in Holmstrom and...

If civil war is a contest for popular support, why would a government ever embark on a policy of disproportionate force and mass killing? The logic of civilian defection expects such an approach to easily backfire, as civilians respond to massive losses by opposing the side that inflicted them....

Many separable dynamic incentive problems have primal recursive formulations in which utility promises serve as state variables. We associate families of dual recursive problems with these by selectively dualizing constraints. We make transparent the connections between recursive primal and dual...

In many real world negotiations, from wage contract bargaining to product liability disputes, the bargaining parties often interact repeatedly and have the option of seeking outside judgement. This paper studies a model of repeated bargaining with a third party to analyze how and why bargaining...

We examine optimal dynamic contracts when the firm's production generates harmful pollution undermining its productivity. The optimal contract rewards for financial performance and penalizes pollution. The combination of both contract sensitivities incentivizes the agent's effort and...

This paper shows the existence of an equilibrium pragmatic Language with a universal grammar as a coordination device under communication misunderstandings. Such a language plays a key role in achieving efficient outcomes in those Sender-Receiver games where there may exist noisy information...

We consider situations in which a principal tries to induce an agent to spend e®ort on accumulating a state variable that a®ects the well-being of both parties. The only incentive mechanism that the principal can use is a state-dependent transfer of her own utility to the agent. Formally, the...

In many real world negotiations, from wage contract bargaining to product liability disputes, the bargaining parties often interact repeatedly and have the option of seeking outside judgement. This paper studies a model of repeated bargaining with a third party to analyze how and why bargaining...