Showing 1 - 10 of 1,090
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001713913
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006765472
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130045
An extension of Condorcet's paradox by McGarvey (1953) asserts that for every asymmetric relation R on a finite set of candidates there is a strict-preferences voter profile that has the relation R as its strict simple majority relation. We prove that McGarvey's theorem can be extended to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459364
Arrow's theorem asserts that under certain conditions every non-dictatorial social choice function leads to nonrational social choice for some profiles. In other words, for the case of non-dictatorial social choice if we observe that the society prefers alternative A over B and alternative B...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752794
We propose and discuss two postulates on the nature of errors in highly correlated noisy physical stochastic systems. The first postulate asserts that errors for a pair of substantially correlated elements are themselves substantially correlated. The second postulate asserts that in a noisy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752801
We will try to explore, primarily from the complexity-theoretic point of view, limitations of error-correction and fault-tolerant quantum computation. We consider stochastic models of quantum computation on $n$ qubits subject to noise operators that are obtained as products of tiny noise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752803
Consider an election between two candidates in which the voters’ choices are random and independent and the probability of a voter choosing the first candidate is p 1/2. Condorcet’s Jury Theorem which he derived from the weak law of large numbers asserts that if the number of voters tends...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752813
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method between at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with non-negligible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752819
On the occasion of Robert J. Aumann's being awarded the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics, this paper gives a personal view on some of Aumann's contributions, and primarily on his approach to foundational issues in game theory, economics, and science as a whole. It is based on numerous discussions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752837