The characteristics of endogenously determined sharing rules and the group-size paradox are studied in a model of group contest with the following features: (i) The prize has mixed private-public good characteristics. (ii) Groups can differ in marginal cost of effort and their membership size....

Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of...

Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of...

The characteristics of endogenously determined sharing rules and the group-size paradox are studied in a model of group contest with the following features: (i) The prize has mixed private-public good characteristics. (ii) Groups can differ in marginal cost of effort and their membership size....

This comprehensive and thought-provoking Handbook reviews public sector economics from pluralist perspectives that either complement or reach beyond mainstream views. The book takes a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach, drawing on economic elements in the fields of philosophy, sociology,...

In this paper we study the endogenous determination of bureaucratic friction in a bureaucratic contest with (<InlineEquation ID="Equ1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX"><![CDATA[$n \ge 2$]]></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>) and without (n=1) rent contestability. When n= 1 bureaucratic impediments induce the individual to undertake rent-securing activities at the same level as in the two-player...</equationsource></inlineequation>

This paper generalizes the widely studied individual rent-seeking model by introducing the possibility of collective rent seeking; n interest groups compete over a fixed rent and individual group members decide voluntarily on the extent of participation in their group rent-seeking activities....