We investigate the hypothesis that conditioning transfers to poor families on school attendance leads to a reallocation of household resources which enhances the human capital of the next generation, via the effect of the conditionality on the shadow price of human capital and (possibly) via the...

We model electoral competition between two parties in a winner-take-all election. Parties choose strategically first their platforms and then their campaign spending under aggregate uncertainty about voters' preferences. We use the model to examine why campaign spending in the United States has...

In this article I survey the political economy literature on electoral participation, strategic voting, and voter information, with some emphasis on recent contributions. In addition, I briefly discuss the relevance of this literature for the consolidation of democracy in Latin America.// En...

We investigate empirically the extent of misreporting in a poverty alleviation program in which self-reported information, followed by a household visit, is used to determine eligibility. In the model we propose and estimate, underreporting may be due to a deception motive, and overreporting to...

In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the...