Conventional parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory do not explain the St. Petersburg paradox. To do so, the power coefficient of an individual's utility function must be lower than the power coefficient of an individual's probability weighting function.

Two recently published studies argue that conventional parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory (CPT) fail to resolve the St. Petersburg Paradox. Yet as a descriptive theory CPT is not intended to account for the local representativeness effect, which is known to induce 'alternation bias'...

Two recently published studies argue that conventional parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory (CPT) fail to resolve the St. Petersburg Paradox. Yet as a descriptive theory CPT is not intended to account for the local representativeness effect, which is known to induce 'alternation bias'...

We find that in cumulative prospect theory (CPT) with a concave value function in gains, a lottery with finite expected value may have infinite subjective value. This problem does not occur in expected utility theory. The paradox occurs in particular in the setting and the parameter regime...

The conventional parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory do not explain the St. Petersburg paradox. To do so, the power coefficient of an individual's utility function must be lower than the power coefficient of an individual's probability weighting function.

Two recently published studies argue that conventional parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory (CPT) fail to resolve the St. Petersburg Paradox. Yet as a descriptive theory CPT is not intended to account for the local representativeness effect, which is known to induce 'alternation bias'...

According to the harmonic sequence paradox (Blavatskyy 2006), an expected utility decision maker's willingness-to-pay for a gamble whose expected payoffs evolve according to the harmonic series is finite if and only if his marginal utility of additional income becomes zero for rather low payoff...