We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so … characterizations of the core using either competition or resource sensitivity. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two …

, we show that on the domain of solvable hedonic coalition formation games, the Core is characterized by coalitional … unanimity and Maskin monotonicity (see also Takamiya, 2010, Theorem 1). Next, we characterize the Core for solvable hedonic … games, there exists a solution not equal to the Core that satisfies coalitional unanimity, consistency, competition …

all men acceptable, Sasaki and Toda (1992) characterize the core by anonymity, Pareto optimality, consistency, and … by characterizing the core on the domain of no odd rings roommate markets by individual rationality, anonymity, Pareto …

One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, as in roommate … problems, any two agents can be matched and second, as in two-sided assignment problems, the payoffs of a matching can be … with a non-empty core), if a subsolution of the core satisfies [indifference with respect to dummy agents, continuity, and …

) blocking dynamics in two-sided one-to-one matching markets with continuous side payments (assignment problems, Shapley and … obtained from the previous one by satisfying a blocking pair (i.e., by matching the two blocking agents and assigning new … the model (i.e., for marriage markets, one-to-one matching, or discretized assignment problems), the existence of blocking …

One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, as in roommate … problems, any two agents can be matched and second, as in two-sided assignment problems, the payoffs of a matching can be … with a non-empty core), if a subsolution of the core satisfies [indifference with respect to dummy agents, continuity, and …