We propose a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of dominance core and a necessary and sufficient condition for coincidence of the core and the dominance core to the setting of multi-choice games.

This paper is devoted to the study of solutions for multi-choice transferable-utility (TU) games which admit a potential, such as the potential associated with a solution in the context of multi-choice TU games. Several axiomatizations of the family of all solutions that admit a potential are...

In this note we link the solutions for multi-choice games proposed by Hsiao and Raghavan (1992), Derks and Peters (1993), and Peters and Zank (2005) with the Shapley values of some particular TU games.

In this note we show that on the domain of fuzzy NTU games whose core is non-empty, the core is the only solution satisfying non-emptiness, individual rationality and the reduced game property.

We propose a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of dominance core and a necessary and sufficient condition for coincidence of the core and the dominance core to the setting of multi-choice games.