This paper is an application of a new Shapley income decomposition methodology, in which we isolate two subjective factors in income differences - race and gender - that contribute to income inequality within the population of blacks and whites in the United States over the period 2005-2017. We...

This work deals with the weighted excesses of players in cooperative games which are obtained by summing up all the weighted excesses of all coalitions to which they belong. We first show that lexicographically minimizing the individual weighted excesses of players gives the same minimal...

We investigate the geopolitical impact and the possible consequences of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. We model the European gas network as a cooperative game between regions as players over the pipeline network, where LNG is also treated as a separate player. We focus on the...

In a liability problem, the asset value of an insolvent firm must be distributed among the creditors and the firm itself, when the firm has some freedom in negotiating with the creditors. We model the negotiations using cooperative game theory and analyze the Shapley value to resolve such...

In this paper we provide a comparative analysis of inequality in household consumption per capita in four South-Eastern European countries, Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, and Serbia. The analysis is based on a largely consistent dataset derived from the World Bank's Living Standards...

Inequality is a multidimensional phenomenon though it is often discussed along a single dimension like income. This is also the case for the various decomposition approaches of inequality indices. In this paper we study one- and multidimensional indices on inequality on data for three large...

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...

We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions amongst subsets of players (reflecting, e.g., ideological proximity) using the paradigm of dynamic programming. Starting from the state-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and...

This paper analyzes vertical integration incentives in a bilaterally duopolistic industry where input market outcomes are determined by bargaining. Vertical integration incentives are a combination of horizontal integration incentives up- and downstream and depend on the strength of...

This paper analyzes the allocation of the total toll collected in a highway among its segments. Based on different toll charging rules, we propose the Segments Equal Sharing method, the Exits Equal Sharing method, and the Entrances Equal Sharing method. We provide axioms and characterize these...