Unlike formal games, most social applications are not accompanied by a complete list describing all relevant actions. As a result, the most difficult task faced by the players is often to formulate a model of the interaction. While it is known how players may learn to play in a game they know,...

The main objects here are two-stage games in which players first compete and subsequently collaborate. We consider instances where second-stage collaboration is anticipated and sustained in terms of core solutions.

This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a finite sequence of exogenously specified TU-games. Three different core concepts are presented: the...

We adapt the core concept to deal with economies in which trade in assets takes place at period 1, uncertainty about asset payoffs is released at period 2, and agents trade in commodities afterwards. We define the weak sequential core as the set of allocations that are stable against coalitional...

Mirman (1979) and Levhari and Mirman (1980) suggested a simple two person multistage game-theoretical model which sheds some light on the economic implications inherent in the fishing conflicts where the decisions of the competitors have an effect on the evolution of the fish population and so,...

This work is focused on identifying a circular pull production control system (PPCS) and make emphasis on the presence of a stability attribute. It is an introductory paper to an extended study of macroeconomic financial stability in a physically open but systemic closed system. Previous work...

We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical...

This paper examines sets of Nash equilibrium in sender-receiver games that are stable against replacement by alternative Nash equilibria. Such stable sets exist. In partial common interest games they contain only informative equilibria.

This paper presents a dynamic model of endogenous coalition formation in cooperative games with transferable utility. The players are boundedly rational. At each time step, a player decides which of the existing coalitions to join, and demands a payoff. These decisions are determined by a (non-...