For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive...

In this note we present as well necessary as sufficient conditions for existence of a Pareto optimum for general non-convex differential games. The obtained results are used to analyze the non-convex regular indefinite linear quadratic differential game. For the scalar case an algorithm is...

We survey some recent research results in the field of dynamic cooperative differential games with non-transferable utilities. Problems which fit into this framework occur for instance if a person has more than one objective he likes to optimize or if several persons decide to combine efforts in...

In this paper I set forth an antitrust remedy for the oligopolistic pricing problem. Oligopoly pricing resembles a repeated prisoners' dilemma game. Each firm has an incentive to moderately lower its price and thus increase its sales at its competitors' expense. However, each firm knows that its...

We study a newsvendor game with transshipments, in which n retailers face a stochastic demand for an identical product. Before the demand is realized, each retailer independently orders her initial inventory. After the demand is realized, the retailers select an optimal transshipment pattern and...

Methods of statistical physics have proven valuable for studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma games. However, recent empirical research shows that cooperative behavior in social dilemmas is only one kind of a more general class of behavior, namely moral behavior, which includes...

Group tasks are often organized by a list: group members state their willingness to contribute by entering their names on a publicly visible, empty list. Alternatively, one could organize the group task by starting with a full list: every group member is already entered on the list and...

We generalise the coalition structure core to partition function games. Our definition relies only on one crucial assumption, namely that there is some internal consistency in the game: residuals of the deviation play a game similar to the initial one, and - whenever this is possible - they come...

This paper strengthens the result of Sengupta and Sengupta (GEB,1996). We show that for the class of TU games with non-empty cores the core can be reached via a bounded number of proposals and counterproposals. Our result is more general than this: the boundedness holds for any two imputations...

We adapt the core concept to deal with economies in which trade in assets takes place at period 1, uncertainty about asset payoffs is released at period 2, and agents trade in commodities afterwards. We define the weak sequential core as the set of allocations that are stable against coalitional...