This paper estimates the extent to which stringent environmental standards in some U.S. states have deterred foreign direct investment (FDI). It addresses three shortcomings in the existing literature on the economic effects of environmental regulations. First, it avoids comparing regulations in...

We propose a concept of self-enforcing risk-sharing agreement that are robust not only to single-person deviations but also to potential deviations by subgroups, requiring that the deviating subgroup itself employs some self-enforcing risk-sharing agreement. We observe that the stability of...

This paper offers an empirical analysis of harvest functions for the two main Chilean pelagic fisheries, which are characterized by cyclical fish abundance. Two main results are obtained. First, we identify production-side effects that weaken the incentives to adjust towards lower fishing...

A canonical interpretation of an infinitely repeated game is that of a "dynastic" repeated game: a stage game repeatedly played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences. These two models are in fact equivalent when the past history of play is observable to...

Concerns about devolving environmental regulatory powers to lower levels of government permeate debates in the U.S. and Europe about the appropriate level of regulatory authority. In theory, given a long list of conditions, regulatory competition by local governments can be efficient in the same...

We construct a bilateral search model of the housing market in which agents differ in their flow rewards while searching. Buyers and sellers enter the market with high flow rewards, but move at a Poisson rate to a state with low flow rewards if they do not transact in the meantime. We...

This paper develops a general equilibrium labor search model to match the dynamic behavior of job creation, job destruction, employment, and labor productivity. Persistence in idiosyncratic productivity levels and endogenous job destruction generate a changing distribution of labor productivity...

This paper introduces a class of games designed to study dynamic, endogenous reform of political institutions. Dynamic political games (DPGs) are dynamic games in which institutional choice is both recursive and instrumental. Future political aggregation rules are decided under current ones, and...