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Delayed perfect monitoring in an in�nitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player's action choice with a fixed, but finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk Theorem extends to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596431
This paper studies repeated games with pure strategies and stochastic discounting under perfect information. We consider infinite repetitions of any finite normal form game possessing at least one pure Nash action profile. The period interaction realizes a shock in each period, and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008833293
This paper studies finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring played in pure strategies. In these games, each player's action set is endowed with a partition, and the equivalence classes of the actions played are publicly observed. We characterize the limit set of equilibrium payoffs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008679896
I consider repeated games with local monitoring: each player observes his neighbors’ moves only. Hence, monitoring is private and imperfect. Communication is private: each player can send different (costless) messages to different players. The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678807
We study finitely repeated games where players can decide whether to monitor the other players' actions or not every period. Monitoring is assumed to be costless and private. We compare our model with the standard one where the players automatically monitor each other. Since monitoring other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010631481
The repeated game literature studies long run/repeated interactions, aiming to understand how repetition may foster cooperation. Conditioning future behavior on past play is crucial in this endeavor. For most situations of interest a given player does not directly observe the actions chosen by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010656001
We extend Fudenberg and Levine’s (1994) characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring as the discount factor approaches one to that of repeated games in which the set of public signals is a continuum. Using this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014197091
A strategy profile in a repeated game has bounded recall L if play under the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216148
We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust under almost-perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013147260
Much of the repeated game literature is concerned with proving Folk Theorems. The logic of the exercise is to specify a particular game, and to explore for that game specification whether any given feasible (and individually rational) value vector can be an equilibrium outcome for some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081895