The basic distinction in the optimization conditions between the general equilibrium model of a T period exchange economy and a strategic market game process model is between a set of equations homogeneous of order zero and a set of nonhomogeneous equations. The latter have an amount M of...

This paper considers the efficiency of financial intermediation and the propagation of business cycle shocks in a model of long-term relationships between entrepreneurs and lenders, where lenders may be constrained in their short-run access to liquidity. When liquidity is low, relationships are...

It is suggested that the appropriate structure for the reconciliation of micro and macroeconomics is an infinite horizon overlapping generations (OLG) model with many finitely lived natural persons and one infinitely lived strategic player without preferences whose choice rule is determined by...

In the context of a single linear structural equation under classical assumptions, we derive the joint conditional density of the LIML endogenous coefficient estimator, and the usual characteristic root arising from the LIML procedure, given the OLS estimates of the reduced form coefficients for...

A simple game-theoretic model of migration is proposed, in which the players are animals, the strategies are territories in a landscape to which they may migrate, and the payoffs for each animal are determined by its ultimate location and the number of other animals there. If the payoff to an...

Product differentiated duopoly with a potential entrant facing a single period fixed cost entry barriers is modeled as a noncooperative game. In addition to characterizing the equilibrium solutions and relating them to entry costs and product differentiation, a comparison of price and quantity...