Narrow search
Showing 101 - 110 of 40,711
Cover Image
It's not a lie if you believe it: On norms, lying, and self-serving belief distortion
Bicchieri, Cristina; Dimant, Eugen; Sonderegger, Silvia - 2019
This paper focuses on belief distortion in the context of lying decisions. We employ a twostage variant of the "dice under the cup" paradigm, in which subjects' beliefs are elicited in stage 1 before performing the dice task in stage 2. In stage 1, we elicit the subjects' beliefs about (i)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012389679
Cover Image
Financial Contagion and the Wealth Effect : An Experimental Study
Bayona, Anna - 2020
We design a laboratory experiment to test the importance of wealth as a channel for financial contagion across markets with unrelated fundamentals. In a sequential global game,we analyze the decisions of a group of investors that hold assets in two markets. We considertwo treatments that vary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842547
Cover Image
Coordination Cycles
Steiner, Jakub - 2006
We build a dynamic global game in which players repeatedly face a similar coordination problem. By choosing a risky … therefore harder to coordinate on, which decreases today's payoff. Expectation of successful coordination tomorrow undermines … successful coordination today which leads to fluctuations of equilibrium behavior even if the underlying economic fundamentals …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734495
Cover Image
Expectations of Reciprocity when Competitors Share Information : Experimental Evidence
Ganglmair, Bernhard - 2019
Informal exchange of information among competitors has been well-documented in a variety of industries, and one's expectation of reciprocity shown to be a key determinant. We use an indeterminate horizon centipede game to establish a feedback loop in the laboratory and show that an individual's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904384
Cover Image
Correlated Beliefs : Predicting Outcomes in 2×2 Games
Cason, Timothy N. - 2019
varies systematically between the type of games (i.e., prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, coordination, and strictly competitive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012890126
Cover Image
Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation : A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Guerra, Alice - 2018
In litigation models, the parties' probability to succeed in a lawsuit hinge upon the merits of the parties' claims and their litigation efforts. In this paper we extend this framework to consider an important procedural aspect of the legal system: the standard of proof. We recast the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936143
Cover Image
It's Not A Lie if You Believe the Norm Does Not Apply : Conditional Norm-Following with Strategic Beliefs
Bicchieri, Cristina - 2020
We experimentally investigate the mechanisms with which strategic distortion of individual beliefs about dominant norms of honesty arise. Embedded in the context of lying, we systematically vary both the nature of elicited beliefs (descriptive about what others do, or normative about what others...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012850284
Cover Image
Public Information and Sequential Learning in a Bilateral Market
Kotsenko, Nikita - 2021
I study the effects of improved public information on equilibrium welfare and price dispersion, providing sufficient conditions for negative and positive effects. Public information affects welfare by reducing excessive (though rational) pessimism induced by sequential learning. Reduced...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013214754
Cover Image
Fragments on the 'Swan' - Money, Credit and Finance in 'The Arcades Project' of Walter Benjamin
Estrada, Fernando - 2010
The main objective of this paper is to present a reading of The Arcades Project by Walter Benjamin in the context of the financial crisis, in particular, reflect from a few fragments of Benjamin's work appear to lie around a Black Swan. The recovery of the fragments of The Arcades seems...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144689
Cover Image
Expectations of reciprocity when competitors share information : experimental evidence
Ganglmair, Bernhard; Holcomb, Alex; Myung, Noah - 2019
Informal exchange of information among competitors has been well-documented in a variety of industries, and one's expectation of reciprocity shown to be a key determinant. We use an indeterminate horizon centipede game to establish a feedback loop in the laboratory and show that an individual's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012055632