Similar Search Results

Institutions as cognitive media between strategic interactions and individual beliefs

Aoki, Masahiko - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 79 (2011) 1, pp. 20-34

This paper begins with contested issues among various approaches to institutions and seeks an analytical/conceptual framework for integrating them. Based on fundamental studies of knowledge theory and epistemic game theory, it discusses the role of institutions in substantive forms as societal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576969

Agreeing to agree

Lehrer, Ehud; Samet, Dov - EconWPA - 2003

Aumann(1976) has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event E if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event E, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for E *do*...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550922

Partial consensus in large games and markets

Desgranges, Gabriel; Ghosal, Sayantan - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012668184

Coordination, team reasoning, and solution thinking

Guala, Francesco - In: Revue d'économie politique 128 (2018) 3, pp. 355-372

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011903543

Common knowledge in game theory

Ménager, Lucie - In: Revue économique : revue bimestrielle 74 (2023) 4, pp. 569-599

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014431147

Mutual knowledge of rationality in the electronic mail game

Takamiya, Koji; Tanaka, Akira - 2006

is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the … desired coordination of actions even when a high order of mutual knowledge of payoff functions obtains. We want to make … coordination never occurs, which is similar to Rubinstein's result. We point out, however, that there exists a class embedding …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332403

Topologies on types

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 275-309

We define and analyze a "strategic topology'' on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a fixed game and action define the distance between a pair of types as the difference...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599372

Interim correlated rationalizability

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 1, pp. 15-40

This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim-correlated-rationalizable outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common certainty of rationality in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599381

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium

Kamada, Yuichiro; Fudenberg, Drew - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 3, pp. 775-806

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599553

Topologies on types

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - 2006

We de.ne and analyze a strategic topology on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a .xed game and action de.ne the distance be-tween a pair of types as the diþerence between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272319