This paper presents an experimental test of a 2-player, one-shot game of conflict in which we vary the strength of property rights and the return on investment. Our results suggest that stronger property rights reduce conflict and increase investment. Contrary to intuition, we find increasing...

This paper reports the results of an experimental test of the Nash equilibrium prediction of voluntary provision of property rights in a contest under anarchy. Specically, the experiment investigates whether pre-commitment induces positive provision of property rights. As pre- dicted, zero...

Consumers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for post-harvest processed (PHP) raw oysters – oysters without health risks – is studied in experimental nth-price auction markets. The experimental design decomposes the effects of taste, objective risk information, and information on four PHP...

There are two means of changing the expected value of a risk: changing the probability of a reward or changing the reward. Theoretically, the former produces a greater change in expected utility for risk averse agents. This paper uses two formats of a risk preference elicitation mechanism under...

This paper derives the conditions under which property rights can arise in an anarchy equilibrium. The creation of property rights requires that players devote part of their endowment to the public good of property rights protection. In the Nash equilibrium, players contribute zero to the...

This paper reports results from a unique two-stage experiment designed to examine the spillover effects of optimism and pessimism. In stage 1, we induce optimism or pessimism onto subjects by randomly assigning a high or low piece rate for performing a cognitive task. We find that participants...