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studies managers who participate repeatedly in a high-powered tournament incentive system, learning relative performance each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014311540
A multi-tournament environment is analyzed, focusing on the impact of organizer market structure on agent entry … behavior. Two high ability agents first decide which tournament to enter (with fields then filled by low ability agents). If …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014420155
assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785932
In a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with heterogeneous agents who may individually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989635
-order tournament. Perceived entitlements are sensitive to how hard an agent has worked relative to her rival, and agents are loss … averse around their meritocratically determined endogenous reference points. In a fair tournament sufficiently large desert … average. In an unfair tournament, where one agent is advantaged, the equilibrium is symmetric in the absence of desert, but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562633
Managers often use tournaments which motivate workers to compete for the top, compete to avoid the bottom, or both. In this paper we compare the effectiveness and efficiency of the corresponding incentive schemes. To do so, we utilize optimal contracts in a principal-agent setting, using a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010633550
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001666613
sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001502463
of our laboratory experiment is a two-stage tournament in which equilibrium efforts are the same in both stages. We … compare this treatment to a strategically equivalent one-stage tournament and to another two-stage tournament with a more … predictions and compared to the equivalent one-stage tournament. The results for the more convex two-stage tournament show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703555
the tournament even further since output tends to become more slipshod. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703722