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KRÄKEL, MATTHIAS - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 07 (2005) 02, pp. 211-228

A two-stage, two-person tournament is discussed, in which each player can influence the other one at the first stage by … choosing help, sabotage or no action. At the second stage, the players choose effort to win the tournament. Helping and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081039

Choosing to Compete: How different are girls and boys?

Booth, Alison L; Nolen, Patrick - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Using a controlled experiment, we examine the role of nurture in explaining the stylized fact that women shy away from competition. Our subjects (students just under 15 years of age) attend publicly-funded single-sex and coeducational schools. We find robust differences between the competitive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082535

Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments

Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2006

. We show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament, the average effort is higher and the between …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086299

Optimal Group Incentives with Social Preferences and Self-Selection

Teyssier, Sabrina - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2007

show that a tournament provides strong incentives to agents who only care about their own payo¤ but that it is not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005029818

Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: The-ory and Experimental Evidence

Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785932

Choosing to Compete: How Different Are Girls and Boys?

Booth, Alison L.; Nolen, Patrick J. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822032

Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822892

Choosing to Compete: How Different are Girls and Boys?

Booth, Alison L.; Nolen, Patrick - Research School of Economics, College of Business and … - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032835

Fairness and Desert in Tournaments

Gill, David; Stone, Rebecca - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2006

situations. In particular we analyze the strategic behaviour of two identical desert-motivated agents in a rank-order tournament … desert-motivated we find that an employer may prefer a tournament to relative performance pay linear in the difference in the … agents` outputs if output noise is sufficiently fat-tailed or if the employer can use the tournament to induce an asymmetric …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051057

Technology Choice and Incentives under Relative Performance Schemes

Kräkel, Matthias; Schöttner, Anja - University of Bonn, Germany - 2010

We identify a new problem that may arise when heterogeneous workers are motivated by relative performance schemes: If workers’ abilities and the production technology are complements, the firm may prefer not to adopt a more advanced technology even though this technology would costlessly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008485509