of our laboratory experiment is a two-stage tournament in which equilibrium efforts are the same in both stages. We … compare this treatment to a strategically equivalent one-stage tournament and to another two-stage tournament with a more … predictions and compared to the equivalent one-stage tournament. The results for the more convex two-stage tournament show that …

We study the effects of communication in an experimental tournament between teams. When teams, rather than individuals …

A two-stage, two-person tournament is discussed, in which each player can influence the other one at the first stage by … choosing help, sabotage or no action. At the second stage, the players choose effort to win the tournament. Helping and …

. We show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament, the average effort is higher and the between …

This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winnertake- all tournament with a single …-take-all tournament. The proportional-prize contest performs better by limiting the degree to which heterogeneity among contestants …

-order tournament. Perceived entitlements are sensitive to how hard an agent has worked relative to her rival, and agents are loss … averse around their meritocratically determined endogenous reference points. In a fair tournament sufficiently large desert … average. In an unfair tournament, where one agent is advantaged, the equilibrium is symmetric in the absence of desert, but …

situations. In particular we analyze the strategic behaviour of two identical desert-motivated agents in a rank-order tournament … desert-motivated we find that an employer may prefer a tournament to relative performance pay linear in the difference in the … agents` outputs if output noise is sufficiently fat-tailed or if the employer can use the tournament to induce an asymmetric …