monitoring. We consider the case in which the large shareholder sits on (and controls) the supervisory board but not the …

charge of project selection and the supervisory board is in charge of monitoring. We consider the case in which the large …

monitoring. We consider the case in which the large shareholder sits on (and controls) the supervisory board but not the …

the board. The board has two tasks: project selection and monitoring the ability of the manager. In a one-tier structure … supervisory board is in charge of monitoring. We show that such a two-tier structure can limit interference from the large … the large shareholder's incentive for monitoring. This results in higher expected profits. If the increase in profits is …

Contemporary governance reform proposals focus on strengthening board monitoring but recent theoretical models find … to choose between a unitary board and a dual board structure. Our evidence indicates that dual boards are more monitoring …

Many governance reform proposals focus on strengthening board monitoring. In contrast, Adams and Ferreira (2007) and … France, where firms are free to choose between a unitary (passive) board and a dual (monitoring) board. We find firms with …