This paper presents a simple theoretical framework in which immigrants have a relative incentive to cluster in host countries where cultural characteristics and imperfect information sustain the segmentation of the labor market and a higher wage in foreign communities. The hypothesis is tested...

In this paper, we investigate endogenous foreign direct investment incentives in an export sector when the tariff is exogenously given. Using a cost-benefit rule to determine export-investment incentives, authorities are shown to set subsidies which neutralize the effects of tariffs and which...

This paper replaces the conventional view of the firm as a nexus of contracts with a strategic approach based on the theory of repeated games, where input contributions and side payments are self-enforcing.

We argue that socializing is an important economic activity because it is vital to our well being, and that an important input into the activity of socializing is the set of experiences that is shared by the participants. Clearly, a person's experiences are generated, in part, by standard...

We analyze the role of commitment in a dynamic principal-agent model of optimal insurance with hidden effort and observable but non-contractible savings. We argue that the optimal contract under full commitment is time-inconsistent. Consequently, we analyze the optimal time-consistent...

This paper examines the incentives that property division laws can have for divorce and investment in marital assets. This paper considers an environment in which spouses have multiple inputs, such as time and money, to a marital asset but the choices a spouse makes with regards to one input,...

The paper examines a model in which the number of immigrants allowed into a country is the outcome of a costly political lobbying process between a firm and a union. The union and the firm bargain over the wage of natives after the number of immigrants that will be permitted is known. I consider...