In electricity day-ahead markets organized as uniform price auction, a small reduction in supply in times of high demand can cause substantial increases in price. We use a unique data set of failures of generation capacity in the German-Austrian electricity market to investigate the relationship...

This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive contracts in the presence of complementary inputs. A downstream firm transforms multiple complementary inputs into final products. When complementary input suppliers have market power, upstream competition within a given input market...

Under the assumption of imperfect competition in a durable good industry, the present paper investigates the efficient regulation of solid waste which causes environmental damage at the end of the product's life. It turns out that the second-best waste tax falls short of the marginal...

This paper studies the market allocation in an economy where material is used for producing a consumption good, then recycled and finally landfilled, and where a recycling firm has market power. The material content constitutes an aspect of green product design and affects the recycling costs....

In some industries, monopoly is natural. One provider can serve the relevant demand cheaper than two or more firms. If the monopoly is not contestable, i.e. not controlled by a credible threat of entry, regulation is necessary. The essential facilities doctrine is one such regulatory tool. It...

This paper studies the relationship between three key elements of the marketing mix, namely, price, product, and promotion, in a model where a seller employs informative advertising to launch a new product. We propose a fairly general advertising technology for the study of three promotional...

To account for the illegal nature of price-fixing agreements, detection probabilities are introduced in a dynamic oligopoly. It follows that for a trigger strategy to sustain a non-cooperative collusive equilibrium as a SPNE both the discount rate and all per-period detection probabilities have...

The condition is derived for Friedman 's trigger strategy to sustaina collusive market equilibrium as a noncooperative Nash equilibriumgiven subjective beliefs as to the antitrust authority's ability of suc-cesfully dissolving the illegal cartel.

Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proofs this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance...

An increase in cartel discovery probability due to irregular price movements that result from cartel defection is shown to increase cartel stability as short-run defection profits are less likely to be earned.