Based on a sample of 227 elections in seventeen Western European countries over the period of 1945-1998, this paper examines to what extent party systems are shaped by fiscal and political decentralization. With the exception of a few special cases, empirical evidence does not support the...

On the basis of aggregated and individual-level survey data of national and regional elections in Spain, this paper analyzes how economic voting is impacted by vertical and horizontal dimensions of clarity of responsibility. Our findings suggest that economic voting is enhanced when mechanisms...

On the basis of a sample of 227 elections in seventeen Western European countries over the period 1945 – 98, we examine to what extent party systems are shaped by fiscal and political decentralization. With the exception of a few special cases, empirical evidence does not support the...

Applying a multilevel model, we argue that tax morale is a function of individual- and contextual-level variables. Evidence presented in this article, based on the 2004-2005 European Social Survey and information on institutional settings, shows that tax morale in European countries varies...

This article examines the institutional and individual determinants of the correct allocation of political responsibilities in a decentralized country such as Spain. It also deals with the learning process of individuals over time. Our results show that the allocation of powers is more...

The quest for political support drives to upward deviations from forecasted public deficits when i) budget procedures are soft, ii) breaking promises involving higher expenditures and lower taxes is costly in political terms, and iii) ex–post control by voters and political opposition is...

In this paper the causal chain connecting the economy and the vote in 2001 Galician regional elections is analyzed. Our findings demonstrate that economic voting is not just a matter of reactions to economic perceptions. It also depends to a great extent on two intermediate mechanisms: whether...