In the framework of the provision of one pure public good, we characterize the class of strategy-proof voting schemes on single-plateaued preferences over a convex and closed subset of the real line (the set of feasible levels of the public good).

Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually-administered punishment, institutional punishment offers a unique potential advantage: the...

Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually administered punishment, institutional punishment offers a unique potential advantage: the...

The paper provides a general analysis of the types of models with E-Perturbations which have been used recently to discuss the evolution of social conventions. Two new measures of the size and structure of the basins of attraction of dynamic systems, the radius and coradius, are introduced in...

The possibility of cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma without memory is investigated in an evolutionary framework where 1) some agents ('Vulcans') are morally commited to cooperation, 2) some others ('Klingons') are not commited at all, and 3) there is random matching.

This paper completely characterizes two public ownership solutions in convex production economies, known respectively as the Proportional Solution (PR), and the Equal Benefit Solution (EB), by adopting the axioms Moulin (1990a,b) discussed and introducing two other axioms, Pareto Independence...

This paper completely characterizes two public ownership solutions in convex production economies, known respectively as the Proportional Solution (PR), and the Equal Benefit Solution (EB), by adopting the axioms Moulin (1990a,b) discussed and introducing two other axioms, Pareto Independence...