I extend the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition by relaxing the assumption of a single technology. The main objective is to study whether the equivalence of the monopolistically competitive equilibrium to the social optimum still holds in the extended model. I show that the...

We examine the determinants of the realized bid-ask spread in the U.S. corporate, municipal, and Treasury bond markets for the period 1995 to 1997, based on newly available transactions data. We find that the bid-ask spread is negatively related to a bond’s trading activity and positively...

Real options models have emerged as a compelling tool for understanding market entry decisions involving sunkness, or irreversibility. In contrast to neoclassical models of investment, real options models consider that uncertainty has a direct effect on the willingness to invest, and that the...

Using proprietary audit trail transactions compiled by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, we investigate, at the individual trader level, (1) the timing and (2) the determinants of dual traders’ personal trades. Our analysis reveals a surprising absence of any trade timing by dual...

In this study we offer a new approach to proving the differentiability of the value function, which complements and extends the literature on dynamic programming. This result is then applied to the analysis of equilibrium in the recent class of monetary economies developed in [13]. For this type...

We empirically examine earnout contracts, which provide for contingent payments in acquisition agreements. Our analysis reveals considerable heterogeneity in the terms of earnout contracts, i.e. the potential size of the earnout, the performance measure on which the contingent payment is based,...

In this paper we replicate and extend the experiment of Fehr and Gaechter (2000) that analyzes the effect of an opportunity to punish others on the level contributions in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism.

The demonstration by Smith [1962] that prices and allocations quickly converge to the competitive equilibrium in the continuous double auction (CDA) was one of the first – and remains one of the most important results in experimental economics. His initial experiment, subsequent market...