Managers' incentives may conflict with those of shareholders or creditors, particularly at leveraged, opaque banks. Bankers may abuse their control rights to give themselves excessive salaries, favored access to credit, or to take excessive risks that benefit themselves at the expense of...

We examine whether examiners were informed and contributed to the health of the banking sector. Information included quantitative information that was eventually made public, quantitative information that remained private, and subjective information dependent on the examiner's production of...

This paper considers the use of the Federal Reserve's ability to provide loans to depository institutions under its discount window lending authority in support of achieving its monetary policy objectives through a funding for lending program. Broadly, a funding for lending program could be...

Carlson et al. (2022) examine the causal impact of banking competition by investigating a unique circumstance in the National Banking Era of the nineteenth century in the US, where a discontinuity in bank capital requirements occurred. On the one hand, their findings suggest that banks operating...