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The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension

Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - 2003

A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325084

Free Trade Networks

Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - 2003

The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation game. We consider a general n-country model in which countries trade differentiated industrial commodities as well as a numeraire good. Countries may be different in the size of the industrial good industry...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325086

The γ-Core and Coalition Formation

Chander, Parkash - 2003

This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that is,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325128

Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems

Konishi, Hideo; Ünver, M. Utku - 2003

pairwise stability when group deviations are allowed. Group deviations are defined in graphs on the set of agents. We introduce …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325144

Stable Matchings for a Generalised Marriage Problem

Lahiri, Somdeb - 2003

We show that a simple generalisation of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley (1962) yields outcomes for a generalised marriage problem, which are necessarily stable. We also show that any outcome of this procedure is Weakly Pareto Optimal for Men, i.e....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325145

Stable Matchings for the Room-mates Problem

Lahiri, Somdeb - 2003

We show that, given two matchings for a room-mates problem of which say the second is stable, and given a non-empty subset of agents S if (a) no agent in S prefers the first matching to the second, and (b) no agent in S and his room-mate in S under the second matching prefer each other to their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325151

Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A mechanism design approach

Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2015

This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. This type of legislation has been passed in many European countries in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327886

The core in the presence of externalities

Kóczy, Lásló À. - 2002

We generalise the coalition structure core to partition function games. Our definition relies only on one crucial …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335686

On the stability of cooperation structures

Haeringer, Guillaume - 2002

This paper studies the payoff structure of stable cooperation structures in link formation games. Players choose non …. We characterize the class of TU-games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, which turns out to be … much larger than the class of superadditive TU-games. We then provide an exact characterization of the Moderer and Shapley …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335692

Environmental effects of consumption: An approach using DEA and cost sharing

Keiding, Hans - 2002

In the paper we propose an to evaluation of the environmental effects of consumption activities. The approach consists of two steps, namely (1) assignment of environmental effects to consumption activities, for which we propose to use the methods of (multidimensional) cost sharing, and (2) a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335759