In three-tier principal-agent models, there is foten concern about the risk of collusion between the supervisor hired by the principal to deal with the agent, and the agent. A collusion-proof contract is often optimal, altough the literature has produced some situations in which collusion is...

The classical price (quantity) discrimination model relies on the assumption that the consumers can neither buy more than one bundle each, nor resell the goods to each other. This assumption is lifted. In a two-type context, the consumers' set strategy is enlarged, first to allow for multiple...

This paper investigates the determinants of the structure of the banking industry by fitting a monopolistic competition model to a sample of banks drawn from eight EEC countries over 1989-1993. In the theoretical model, banks decide strategically both entry and the branching size of thier...

This paper studies optimal investment in different types of electric plants. Neither future fuel prices nor future demand are known. Furthermore, we take into account explicitly the problems of management of the peak load and of the decrease of efficiency of plants used for long periods. A two...

An elementary proof of the existence of a competitive equilibrium is given for economies where the weak axiom of revealed preference or the gross substitution property hold. It is shown by an induction argument that in these cases, the problem is reduced to the question of the existence of an...

In this paper we analyse the problem of the modelling of individual transitions in presence of an incomplete sampling scheme.

We examine an important class of decision problem under uncertainty that entails the standarrd portfolio problem and the demand for coinsurance. The agent faces a controllable risk -his demand for a risky asset for example- and a background risk. We determine how a change in the distribution in...

This paper is aimed at assesssing the empirical relevance of the new theory of regulation inspired by the theory of incentives. It contributes to the econometrics of asymmetric information models by using the principal-agent framework for studying the regulatory schemes used in French urban...