Two methods for pricing an externality -taxes and strict liability- are modeled as lobbying contests with endogenous numbers of participants. In the tax contest, a regulator is susceptible to lobbying by polluters and victims. Under liability, the court's view is affected by legal representation.

It has been widely argued that tort law can provide an effective decentralizes mechanism by which a socially optimal level of externality control can be achieved. I reconsider this argument in the very common situation in which there are multiple contributors to an incident of external damages,...

This paper has examined the different approaches used by courts to adjudicate liability when two or more individuals jointly cause the external damages.

It has been widely argued that tort law can provide an effective decentralizes mechanism by which a socially optimal level of externality control can be achieved. I reconsider this argument in the very common situation in which there are multiple contributors to an incident of external damages,...